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Abstract—We study the convergence of European bond markets and the
anchoring of inflation expectations in the euro area from 1993 to 2008,
using high-frequency bond yield data for France, Germany, Italy, and
Spain; some smaller euro-area countries; and a control group comprising
the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden. We find that Economic and
Monetary Union (EMU) led to substantial convergence in euro-area
sovereign bond markets in terms of interest rate levels, unconditional
daily fluctuations, and conditional responses to major macroeconomic
announcements. Our findings also suggest a substantial increase in the
anchoring of long-term inflation expectations since EMU, particularly for
Italy and Spain. Finally, we present evidence that the elimination of
exchange rate risk and the adoption of a common monetary policy were
the primary drivers of bond market convergence in the euro area, as
opposed to fiscal policy and the loose exchange rate peg of the 1990s.
I. Introduction
TO what extent has the Economic and Monetary Union(EMU) in Europe been successful? Answering this
question requires defining what it means for EMU to be
‘‘successful.’’ In this paper, we focus on the monetary union
aspects of the EMU, in particular, the extent to which
monetary union led to the integration of bond markets
across euro-area countries and the effects it had on the
anchoring of long-term inflation expectations within those
countries. These two dimensions of monetary policy in the
euro-area are intimately related because long-term bond
yields in any given country are sensitive to financial market
expectations about long-run inflation. Indeed, our analysis
in this paper focuses on the insights that one can draw about
the monetary union and monetary policy from the high-fre-
quency behavior of euro-area bond yields.
First, we investigate to what extent the sovereign bond
markets in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, the four lar-
gest euro-area countries, have become integrated along with
the unification of their currencies and monetary policies. It is
not clear that a common currency and monetary policy
necessarily leads to an integrated bond market; for example,
differences in default risk across countries or differences in
liquidity could imply substantial differences in yield spreads
across countries and over time. Indeed, Italy’s debt-to-GDP
ratio in 2003 was 97%, while France’s was 53% and Ger-
many’s 38% (OECD, 2005), implying substantial differences
in debt-servicing burdens across these euro-area countries.
From 1999 to 2001, average bid-ask spreads for German
bonds were 2.49 basis points (bp), with quotes coming from
sixteen different dealers per bond, while average bid-ask
spreads for Italian bonds were 4.66 bp, with quotes from an
average of 6.5 dealers per bond, suggesting possibly impor-
tant differences in the liquidity of bonds of different EMU
countries (Jankowitsch, Mo¨senbacher, & Pichler, 2006).
We propose two types of tests for bond market integration
in these four countries. The first test looks at the uncondi-
tional correlations between yields of different countries.
We find strong evidence of convergence in the levels and
comovement of yields across countries even for daily
changes in yields that might be expected to be substantially
affected by idiosyncratic shocks and differential liquidity
characteristics. Although the current financial market turmoil
has increased spreads and reduced comovement across euro-
area yields, due perhaps to differences in risk and liquidity
across countries, we show that these spreads are still very
small compared to the period before EMU. Moreover, using
the United Kingdom as a control country for comparison, we
show that this convergence in levels and comovement is
unique to the euro-area members, suggesting that this conver-
gence is due to EMU rather than to a more general global ten-
dency toward convergence across all developed countries.
Our second type of test looks at the conditional, as
opposed to the unconditional, behavior of bond yields in the
euro-area countries. That is, conditional on the announce-
ment of a given piece of economic news, do yields in
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain react similarly? In a uni-
fied bond market, bonds of different countries (at the same
maturity) should respond similarly to the same impulse
whether or not there are constant differences in risk or
liquidity spreads and whether or not there is bond-specific
and country-specific noise. As conditioning variables, we
use major macroeconomic announcements in the four euro-
area countries, the aggregate euro area, the United Kingdom
and the United States. We find that there has been a remark-
able convergence and reduction over time in the heterogene-
ity of euro-area yield responses to these macroeconomic
announcements. This convergence process seems to have
been strongest just before and after monetary union in 1999,
underlining the likely role of monetary union in this process.
Having established evidence in favor of bond market uni-
fication, we turn to the question of long-run inflation expec-
tations in the euro-area countries. One desired outcome at
the time when EMU was conceived was having countries
with less well-anchored expectations, and therefore more
volatile financial markets, benefit from a more credible
monetary policymaking framework. Following Gu¨rkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2005), we therefore ask whether the
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volatility of very far-ahead forward interest rates has
decreased over time. Intuitively, if long-run inflation expec-
tations in a country are well anchored, then its far-ahead
forward interest rates should be more stable than if those
long-run inflation expectations are not well anchored. We
show that the volatility of far-ahead forward rates has
decreased significantly in Italy and Spain, to the level of
Germany and France (which itself has decreased some-
what), suggesting that the anchoring of long-run inflation
expectations in the former two countries has converged to
about the same level as the latter two.
EMU has been a multifaceted process with different
stages, including exchange rate management, criteria for
fiscal policy, and finally monetary union with a single
monetary policy. It is therefore difficult to gauge which of
these elements has been the most important one in driving
bond market convergence in Europe. We nevertheless try to
shed light on this question by extending our analysis to the
more limited data that we have available for Belgium, Fin-
land, Denmark, and Sweden. The first two of these coun-
tries are members of EMU and the last two are not, but
Denmark strongly and credibly pegs its currency to the euro
while Sweden allows its currency to float freely. This exten-
sion not only confirms the robustness of our results for the
four largest EMU members, it also helps to shed light on
the mechanisms of the convergence process by showing
that Danish yields are now indistinguishable from EMU
member countries’ yields, while Swedish yields continue to
behave very differently.
Our analysis of convergence of bond yields and long-
run inflation expectations in the euro area draws on several
strands of the literature. Baele et al. (2004) is an early con-
tribution that studied the convergence in the govern-
ment bond markets of EMU member countries with lower
(monthly) frequency data; our tests for bond market integra-
tion at a daily frequency thus represent a much stricter test
for unification. Since Baele et al., a number of other studies
have found significant differences in yield spreads across
euro-area countries even after EMU due to either differ-
ences in credit risk (Codogno, Favero, & Missale, 2003;
Manganelli & Wolswijk, 2009) or liquidity (Go´mez-Puig,
2006; Jankowitsch et al., 2006; Favero, Pagano, & von
Thadden, 2010).1 Relative to these studies, our contribution
is to look at high-frequency, daily bond market data over a
long time series to investigate the extent of bond market
convergence in EMU countries. Such a comprehensive
study using daily data has not been carried out previously
because daily yield curves for some of our countries are not
generally available.
Our paper also studies the convergence and anchoring of
long-term inflation expectations in the euro-area by analyz-
ing the behavior of far-ahead forward interest rates. In this
respect, we build on the work of Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005)
for the United States and Gu¨rkaynak, Levin, and Swanson
(2010) for the United States, United Kingdom, and Sweden.
Those studies find that far-ahead forward interest rates in
the United States respond significantly to macroeconomic
announcements, while those in the United Kingdom and
Sweden (both inflation targeters) are much less responsive,
suggesting a better anchoring of long-term inflation expec-
tations in the latter two countries. Ehrmann, Fratzscher, and
Rigobon (2005) show that euro-area macroeconomic
announcements do not have significant effects on United
States financial markets, while Ehrmann and Fratzscher
(2005) show that the effects of United States macroeco-
nomic announcements on European financial markets have
increased since the advent of EMU, which they relate to
financial market learning. Goldberg and Klein (2005) study
euro-area interest rates in the immediate aftermath of EMU
and show that their response to United States inflation sur-
prises changes over this period, which they interpret as the
ECB’s gaining greater credibility in financial markets after
its inception.
Although not directly related to our bond market analy-
sis, there are also a few studies of how capital flows and
equity market returns have converged in the euro-area due
to EMU (Coeurdacier & Martin, 2009; Fratzscher &
Stracca, 2009), and a literature on the effects of the euro-
area customs union on the goods market, which finds mixed
evidence on convergence. For example, Canova, Ciccarelli,
and Ortega (2007) find that business cycles have not
become more aligned in euro-area countries after EMU
while Rogers (2007) finds that price dispersion across these
countries has diminished. Lane (2006) contains an accessi-
ble summary of the general convergence after the EMU, in
real and financial sectors and well as labor mobility.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II describes the data, including the yields, the macro-
economic surprises as conditioning variables, and the choice
of subperiods around the advent of EMU. Section III con-
tains the results of the tests of convergence, and section
IV presents evidence on the anchoring of long-term infla-
tion expectations. Section V extends the analysis to smaller
EMU and non-EMU countries and discusses possible
sources of yield curve convergence. Section VI offers a gen-
eral discussion of the findings and concludes. An online data
appendix, available at http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/
suppl/10.1162/REST_a_00055, provides a detailed descrip-
tion of all the data used in our analysis.
1 There has been a discussion whether the ECB’s collateral policy leads
market participants to ignore differences in national sovereign default
risk. The ECB has classified assets that can be used as collateral in its reg-
ular monetary policy operations, assigning specific ‘‘valuation haircuts’’
to each category. These haircuts specify a percentage discount that is
applied to the market price of an asset when used as collateral. The dis-
cussion focused on the fact that government bonds from all national cen-
tral governments have been classified in the same category. Buiter and
Sibert (2006) argued that this will effectively turn them into perfect sub-
stitutes, such that markets ignore country-specific default risk. Issing
(2005), on the other hand, argued that the ECB values any asset that is
taken as collateral at market values, such that a differentiation according
to default risk is already incorporated. The evidence of Manganelli and
Wolswijk (2009) suggests that government bond yield spreads do in fact
depend on the rating of the underlying bond.
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II. Data
A detailed account of all the data used in our analysis is
presented in the online data appendix that accompanies this
paper, but is briefly summarized here. The basic data we
employ are daily zero-coupon government bond yields for a
number of European countries. We study these data in
terms of their levels, their unconditional variances and cov-
ariances, and their conditional responses to major macro-
economic announcements in Europe and the United States.
A. Yields
In order to compare apples to apples in our analysis, we
require bond yield data that are as comparable as possible
across all of our countries. This requires data from a zero-
coupon yield curve for each country, which removes differ-
ences in coupon rates, bond maturities, and individual bond
idiosyncrasies across countries and allows a clean compari-
son of yields from one country to another (see Gu¨rkaynak,
Sack, and Wright, 2007, for additional discussion).
We obtained daily zero-coupon yield curve data for Bel-
gium, Finland, Germany, Spain, and Sweden from the Bank
for International Settlements in Basel (which collects these
data directly from each country’s central bank), daily yield
curve data for the United Kingdom from the Bank of Eng-
land, and daily yield curve data for Denmark from the Dan-
marks Nationalbank. Similar yield curve data for France
and Italy for the time periods we were interested in are not
available from the BIS or other sources, so we computed
the yield curves for these two countries ourselves using
bond market price data from Bloomberg Financial Services
and the methods employed by Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2007) for
the United States (the other yield curves in our sample are
estimated using very similar methods by the central banks
themselves). Because of the distribution of bond maturities
available from Bloomberg, short-term (less than five-year)
yields for France and Italy are reliable only beginning in
1995, while five-year and longer rates for these countries
and all yields for Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom
go back to at least 1993. The yield curve data for Belgium,
Finland, Denmark, and Sweden, which we use for robust-
ness checks, begin in 1999.
B. Macroeconomic Announcements
For our conditional analysis of bond market responses,
we examine the high-frequency response of bond yields to
major macroeconomic data releases in each of France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain, the euro area as a whole, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. However, it is not enough
to use the raw macroeconomic data releases themselves as
explanatory variables because financial markets are forward
looking and thus should not respond to the component of
these announcements that are expected (Kuttner, 2001, con-
firms this hypothesis for the case of monetary policy
announcements in the United States). Thus, we wish to con-
struct the unexpected or surprise component of each of our
macroeconomic data releases and use these data release sur-
prises as the conditioning variables for our bond market
analysis.
We compute macroeconomic data release surprises as the
realized value of the macroeconomic data release on the
day of the announcement less the financial markets’ expec-
tation for that realized value. We obtained data on financial
market expectations of major macroeconomic data releases
from two sources: Money Market Services (MMS) and
Bloomberg Financial Services (we use the median response
of the respective polls as our measure of market expecta-
tions, as is standard in the literature). Details of these data
are provided in the data appendix. Andersen et al. (2003)
and others have verified that these data pass standard tests
of forecast rationality and provide a reasonable measure of
ex ante expectations of the data release. We verified that
this is the case for our data as well.
To make our regression coefficient estimates comparable
across different data releases, we normalize each series by
its sample standard deviation, so that the regression coeffi-
cient on each series can be interpreted as a response per
1-standard-deviation surprise. For example, on October 21,
1998, the German IFO index was expected to come in at
97, but the released value was 94; since the historical stan-
dard deviation of the surprise in this data release is 1.16, we
record this as a surprise of 2.58 standard deviations for
that statistic on that date.
Two additional issues regarding the macroeconomic data
surprises bear further discussion. One is availability, as most
of the surprises for Italy and Spain in our sample are avail-
able only from the beginning of 1997 onward, and euro-area
aggregate data releases are generally available beginning
only in 1999. Moreover, after the introduction of the euro,
national monetary aggregate data cease to exist, so only the
euro-area aggregate and its surprise component are avail-
able to us from that date onward. Table A1 in the online
appendix lists all of the macroeconomic data surprise series
we have used and the dates for which they are available.
The second issue is that European bond yields often react
very little to euro-area aggregate data releases due to the
fact that these releases aggregate information that has
already been made public by the individual euro-area mem-
ber countries.2 For this reason, we include United States
and United Kingdom surprises as explanatory variables in
our analysis as well. This has the added benefit that these
series are often available over a long history, typically for
as long as our bond yield data are available. Note that using
foreign surprises here does not create a problem for study-
ing bond market integration. Being agnostic on why United
States surprises move European yields, we assert only that
2 For instance, euro-area inflation announcements and even German
inflation announcements occur not only much later than their U.S. coun-
terparts, but they also contain less information as they are preceded by
announcements by each German state’s inflation figures. See Ehrmann
and Fratzscher (2005).
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if one country’s yields are responding to a given data sur-
prise, others’ should as well if bond markets are integrated.
C. Sample Periods
A final point relates to our choice of sample and subsam-
ple periods. The decision to have a monetary union within
the EU was agreed on in the Maastricht Treaty in February
1992. However, in September 1992, the ERM (exchange rate
mechanism) crisis led several countries to devalue their cur-
rencies and drop out of the exchange rate system. We thus
begin our sample in 1993 to make sure the results are not dri-
ven by the very high volatility in the immediate aftermath of
the ERM crisis, although there was still some currency vola-
tility and uncertainty in subsequent years. In May 1998, the
eligible countries for inclusion in the monetary union were
announced, and on January 1, 1999, the exchange rates for
the countries entering monetary union were irrevocably
fixed and the euro was introduced. Our data extend through
June 2008, which implies that our analysis includes about a
year of the financial market turmoil beginning in 2007.
Given this time line, we use January 1993 through
December 1998 as our pre-EMU sample and January 2002
through June 2008 as our post-EMU sample. We begin the
latter sample in 2002 to make sure that we are not capturing
effects of the initial period of evolving credibility of the
ECB, as Goldberg and Klein (2005) argued.
We check these subsample choices more formally using
an Andrews-Ploberger (1994) test to detect the precise date
of structural changes in the yields of euro-area countries.
For this purpose, we regress French, Italian, and Spanish
bond yields on the comparable-maturity German yield and
a constant—a regression to which we return in more detail
in section III. Breakpoint tests for each country and bond
maturity, reported in Ehrmann et al. (2008), always find a
highly significant structural break in the data occurring
before January 1, 1999, and typically in 1996 or 1997,
which suggests that financial markets anticipated the begin-
ning of monetary union well before the unification officially
took place. Instead of January 1, 1999, we therefore could
have used an earlier date as the end of our pre-EMU sam-
ple, but we chose to remain with the formal introduction of
the euro. Note that by not choosing an earlier break point,
we bias our results against our hypotheses: we may be
including data points where bond markets had already con-
verged, so we should find weaker evidence for bond market
integration in our comparisons of the pre- and post-EMU
periods. Moreover, we stress that our results are insensitive
to variations in the start and end dates of the two subsam-
ples. In particular, starting the pre-EMU sample in 1994 or
choosing an earlier start date for the post-EMU sample does
not change our conclusions below.
III. Convergence of Yields
We begin by investigating the degree to which yields of
different maturities have converged across our four large
euro-area countries—France, Germany, Italy, and Spain—
for which we have a long time series of daily yields. Given
that a high degree of sustainable convergence was a prere-
quisite for entry into the monetary union, finding some
degree of convergence in yields before the European Cen-
tral Bank (ECB) came into existence is to be expected. Our
interest is in the timing and the extent of this convergence.
We first study the yields across countries unconditionally
and then look at the conditional correlations, using major
macroeconomic data release surprises as the conditioning
variables.
A. Unconditional Results
To study whether and when the government bond mar-
kets in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain integrated with
EMU, we focus on the daily behavior of bond yields in
these four countries. The advantage of using such high-
frequency data for our analysis is that it sets a higher stan-
dard for bond market convergence: at lower frequencies, it
is more likely that some degree of cross-country arbitrage
will reduce interest rate differentials across those countries
and make those bond markets appear more similar. That is,
finding convergence in financial markets using monthly
data is more likely than finding it in daily data. Our results
therefore extend those in the literature by studying higher-
frequency data as well as an extended sample period.3
The evolution of daily yield curves for each of our four
euro-area countries is summarized in figure 1, the central
figure of this section. The top panel of the figure depicts the
two-year bond yields at daily frequency. At the beginning
of the sample period, the German two-year yields are the
lowest, with the French yields slightly above them. The
Spanish and Italian two-year yields are five to six percen-
tage points higher than the other two. The most striking fea-
ture of the graph is the speed and extent of the convergence
of yields. The French and German yields had become
essentially identical by 1997, and the Spanish and Italian
ones joined them by 1999. The lines for the four countries
are indistinguishable from then on.
This is striking precisely because we are using daily data.
There is not a single day after 1999 on which the two-year
yield on government notes was noticeably different in one
of the countries compared to the others. That is, the short-
term bond markets in these countries were unified to the
extent that any deviations across countries appear to have
been arbitraged away on a daily basis. Note, importantly,
that convergence had taken place even before monetary
union had actually taken place. That is, the expectation of
unification unified the sovereign bond markets, which was
also suggested by the results of the structural break point
test discussed in the previous section.
3 While they focus, as all other studies do, on monthly data, Codogno
et al. (2003) also include a section that studies one year of daily data.
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To ensure that this convergence is due to EMU and is not
an artifact of broader convergence in the yields of industria-
lized European countries, figure 1 also includes the two-
year yield from the United Kingdom, an EU member that is
not a member of the euro area. The United Kingdom two-
year yield clearly stands out in the figure, suggesting that
convergence in rates did indeed happen because of the
monetary union and not because of other global or regional
factors that were leading to convergence across developed
countries’ financial markets more generally.
The middle panel of figure 1 repeats the analysis using
five-year yields. We have data on five-year yields for all of
our countries going back further, to 1993, but the results are
very much the same as for two-year yields. Finally, the bot-
tom panel of the figure depicts ten-year yields, which shows
slightly more variation across countries in long-term inter-
est rates—in particular, the Italian ten-year yield has been a
touch higher than the others in the recent past—but this dif-
ference is tiny compared to the differences before 1999.
We present three kinds of statistical measures to quantify
the extent of the convergence that is so visually striking in
figure 1. First, we look at the raw correlations of yields of
the same maturity between different countries for the pre-
EMU (1993–1998) and post-EMU (2002–2008) samples.
Second, we show regression results for each country’s
yields regressed on German yields of the same maturity in
each of the two sample periods. (We pick German yields as
a benchmark because Germany and the deutsche mark had
functioned as the anchor during the run-up to monetary
union.) Third, we provide evidence from principal compo-
nent analysis.
The results of the first two tests are reported in tables 1
and 2. The correlation analysis confirms the visual impres-
sion and earlier results for lower-frequency data in that the
correlations between the yields of France, Germany, Italy,
and Spain have increased significantly after EMU—in fact,
almost all of these are .99—while the correlations of the
yields of these countries with those of the United Kingdom
have decreased.4 The R2 statistics of the regression of each
country’s yields on German yields in table 2 reinforce the
raw correlations. Interestingly, the proportion of the var-
iance that these simple regressions can explain appears to
be even larger than those reported in Baele et al. (2004),
especially for the shorter maturities, suggesting that conver-
gence has strengthened over the most recent years covered
FIGURE 1.—TIME SERIES OF CONSTANT-MATURITY YIELDS
4 Throughout the paper, we study unconditional relationships in levels
and conditional ones in changes. This is to make the results comparable
to the corresponding literature; for example, level/slope/curvature decom-
positions of the yield curve (which we study in table 3) always refer to
yields in levels, while event study regressions (which we study in table 4)
look at changes in yields in response to news. Our conclusions regarding
bond yield convergence would be broadly similar if we presented the
unconditional analysis in changes as well. Those results are not presented
here in the interest of space, but are available from the authors on request;
some sense of them can also be gleaned from table 4.
Almost all of the changes in correlation coefficients across samples are
statistically significant because with daily data, we have very large num-
bers of observations in each sample, leading to very precise estimates.
Note that the correlation coefficients are estimated over the sample for
which data exist in all countries, effectively making the early sample for
the two-year yield the 1995–1998 period.
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in our sample. This is particularly striking given the fact
that we analyze daily frequency data, which one would
expect to show less comovement than data at lower fre-
quencies. The slope coefficients in table 2, which were quite
far from unity prior to EMU, have become economically
indistinguishable from unity across the four countries after
EMU, while the coefficients in the regressions involving
the United Kingdom have continued to have slopes of vary-
TABLE 2.—REGRESSIONS OF BOND YIELDS ON GERMAN YIELDS
Pre-EMU Post-EMU
FR IT SP UK FR IT SP UK
A: Two-Year Yields
GE 1.425*** 2.498*** 2.495*** 0.628*** 0.989*** 0.994*** 0.996*** 0.495***
(0.022) (0.073) (0.057) (0.015) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.014)
Constant 1.524*** 3.297*** 4.129*** 3.992*** 0.028*** 0.010 0.037*** 2.924***
(0.089) (0.315) (0.245) (0.073) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.046)
Observations 953 953 953 953 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618
R2 0.86 0.48 0.58 0.63 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.42
B: Five-Year Yields
GE 1.170*** 2.524*** 2.386*** 0.829*** 1.000*** 1.065*** 1.022*** 0.552***
(0.005) (0.028) (0.022) (0.014) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.011)
Constant 0.856*** 5.434*** 5.398*** 2.443*** 0.045*** 0.171*** 0.092*** 2.609***
(0.027) (0.155) (0.124) (0.079) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.042)
Observations 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618
R2 0.94 0.82 0.85 0.71 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.52
C: Ten-Year Yields
GE 1.112*** 2.456*** 2.221*** 1.091*** 0.951*** 0.979*** 1.015*** 0.495***
(0.004) (0.025) (0.021) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009)
Constant 0.523*** 6.109*** 5.295*** 0.641*** 0.317*** 0.389*** 0.085*** 2.677***
(0.023) (0.149) (0.130) (0.058) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.034)
Observations 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,428 1,618 1,618 1,618 1,618
R2 0.96 0.86 0.88 0.91 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.62
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
TABLE 1.—CORRELATIONS OF BOND YIELDS ACROSS COUNTRIES
Pre-EMU Post-EMU
FR GE IT SP UK FR GE IT SP UK
A: Correlations of Two-Year Yields
FR 1.000 1.000
GE 0.930 1.000 0.998 1.000
IT 0.863 0.694 1.000 0.997 0.995 1.000
SP 0.908 0.762 0.990 1.000 0.997 0.997 0.996 1.000
UK 0.691 0.793 0.559 0.587 1.000 0.664 0.650 0.635 0.665 1.000
Sample size: 953 Sample size: 1,618
B: Correlations of Five-Year Yields
FR 1.000 1.000
GE 0.969 1.000 0.998 1.000
IT 0.945 0.905 1.000 0.996 0.993 1.000
SP 0.965 0.922 0.991 1.000 0.996 0.994 0.993 1.000
UK 0.845 0.841 0.785 0.797 1.000 0.719 0.721 0.687 0.697 1.000
Sample size: 1,428 Sample size: 1,618
C: Correlations of Ten-Year Yields
FR 1.000 1.000
GE 0.981 1.000 0.978 1.000
IT 0.959 0.929 1.000 0.994 0.983 1.000
SP 0.966 0.940 0.995 1.000 0.989 0.970 0.984 1.000
UK 0.950 0.952 0.907 0.910 1.000 0.750 0.790 0.753 0.709 1.000
Sample size: 1,428 Sample size: 1,618
Boldface entries are statistically significantly larger (at 1%) than their counterparts in the pre-EMU or post-EMU sample.
355CONVERGENCE AND ANCHORING OF YIELD CURVES IN THE EURO AREA
ing magnitudes.5 Consistent with the convergence hypoth-
esis, the constants in the regressions have also shrunk
toward zero from the pre-EMU to the post-EMU sample.
Another way to think about bond market unification is
that it implies there will be a single latent factor that under-
lies yields of the same maturity across all of the countries in
our sample. We explore this implication using principal
components analysis. For any given maturity (say, the two-
year yield), let X denote the T  4 matrix with rows corre-
sponding to days and columns corresponding to countries.
X can be written as
X ¼ FKþ g;
where F is a T  k matrix of unobserved factors (with k <
4), L is a k  4 matrix of factor loadings, and g is a T  4
matrix of white noise disturbances. The hypothesis that
sovereign bond markets are integrated is a statement that
there exists a T  1 vector F and constants ki, i ¼ 1,. . .,k,
such that the matrix X is described by F  [k1,. . .,kk] up to
white noise.
Table 3 reports the percentage of total variation of each
maturity that is explained by the first two principal compo-
nents. The factor loadings (not reported here for brevity,
but available in Ehrmann et al., 2008) show that the first
factor loads evenly on all countries (the common factor),
while the second factor differentiates Italy and Spain from
France and Germany (it loads positively on France and Ger-
many and negatively on Italy and Spain). In the pre-EMU
period, the second factor explains a nonnegligible part of
the total variation at all maturities, whereas in the post-
EMU period the first, common factor explains essentially
all of the variation. That is, the factor analysis implies that
after EMU, there is a single latent factor—in effect, a euro-
area–wide factor—that describes the behavior of yields in
all four countries, suggesting that with the monetary union
bond markets across the countries have become completely
integrated.
The results in this section show, visually and statistically,
a remarkable convergence in bond yields of the four largest
euro-area countries around the time of the monetary union.
We next move from the unconditional results to the condi-
tional ones and ask how the responses of the yields of dif-
ferent euro-area countries to data surprises have changed
from before monetary union to after.
B. Conditional Results
Our finding of unconditional convergence in bond yields
above could come about in two different ways. First, bond
markets may have reacted similarly to shocks during both
the pre-EMU and post-EMU periods, but country-specific
idiosyncratic shocks were much more important in the pre-
EMU period and common shocks more important after
EMU. The diminishing importance of country-specific idio-
syncratic shocks would then show up in the bond markets as
convergence. Alternatively, common shocks may have been
equally important in both the pre-EMU and post-EMU peri-
ods, but bond markets in each country may have reacted dif-
ferently to these common fundamental shocks before EMU
and more similarly after EMU. To investigate more fully the
type of convergence that has taken place, we now analyze
the conditional movements in bond yields in our four coun-
tries in response to major macroeconomic data releases.
Our regression specification for this analysis is





bi;jk;lSurprisek;l;t þ Ei;jt ; ð1Þ
where Dyt
i,j denotes the daily change in the yield of matur-
ity j (j E {2, 5, 10} years) of country i (i E {France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain}) on date t. We have surprise data from
six countries and the euro-area (k E {France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, U.K., U.S., euro area}), and there are Lk data
series used from each of these, indexed by l (l E{CPI,
Unemployment, etc.}). In regression specification (1) and
throughout the paper when we do conditional analysis, we
restrict our sample to days on which there was at least one
major macroeconomic data release. This focuses the
empirical analysis on those days for which we have nonzero
explanatory variables, but expanding the sample to include
all days (whether or not there was a data release) does not
have a substantial impact on any of the results below.
TABLE 3.—PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS OF YIELDS ACROSS COUNTRIES
Pre-EMU Post-EMU
Two-Year Five-Year Ten-Year Two-Year Five-Year Ten-Year
Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield Yield
Contributions of:
First PC 0.895 0.962 0.971 0.998 0.996 0.987
Second PC 0.097 0.031 0.024 0.001 0.002 0.008
Contributions of first and second principal components (PCs) to the cross-sectional variance of bond yields across France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The first PC is a common factor that loads about equally on
the four countries; the second PC differentiates France and Germany from Italy and Spain (that is, it loads positively on France and Germany and negatively on Italy and Spain). See text for details.
5 Statistically, the slope coefficients are not quite unity, as with daily
data they are estimated with a very high degree of precision. Thus .99,
while economically the same as unity here, remains statistically different
from it.
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Due to data availability, we have more data surprises for
the United States than for any other country, but this does
not present any particular difficulties because United States
macroeconomic data releases are known to significantly
affect financial markets in Europe as well as in the United
States (Andersen et al., 2007; Ehrmann & Fratzscher,
2005). Note that due to data availability, not all of the data
releases we consider were present in both the pre- and post-
EMU samples.
Regression results from specifications using the complete
set of all 37 of our data release surprises are not presented
to save space and because most of those coefficients are not
statistically significant anyway, especially for European
macro data announcements in the pre-EMU period. There-
fore, table 4 reports results from a more parsimonious spe-
cification that uses a subset of the available macroeconomic
announcements: the most important U.S. data releases (as
found by Fleming & Remolona, 1999), the CPI inflation
releases for each of the four euro-area countries, and the
M3 growth rates for Germany and the euro area as a whole
(which may be expected to matter because of the emphasis
placed on monetary aggregate growth rates by the Bundes-
bank and then by the ECB).6
The most important point of table 4 is that before EMU,
there were no cases where all countries’ yields responded
significantly to the same data release. One could use this as
a definition of market segmentation—prices are not moved
by the same common fundamentals.7 By contrast, after
EMU yields of euro-area countries react in a much less het-
erogeneous manner to macroeconomic announcements. In
table 4, this is especially the case for the major releases of
U.S. ISM, U.S. nonfarm payrolls, and the German CPI and
IFO index. The direction and size of the responses to these
releases are as one might expect: surprises in all of these
procyclical releases lead to higher yields in all countries.
Moreover, the sizes of the responses are similar to what
was found in the United States for comparable releases by
Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2005).
This point is illustrated graphically in figure 2. To con-
struct the figure, we perform rolling four-year regressions
of the same form as in table 4 and equation (1). For each of
the nine macroeconomic series listed in figure 2 (U.S. non-
farm payrolls, U.S. ISM, and so on), we plot at each point
in time the cross-country standard deviation of the response
coefficients bi;jk;l estimated over the trailing four-year win-
dow. (Thus, when the coefficients bi;jk;l differ greatly across
our four countries, the cross-sectional standard deviation
plotted in figure 2 is higher.) This procedure allows us to
visualize the evolution over time of the cross-country het-
TABLE 4.—RESPONSE OF TWO-YEAR YIELDS TO MACROECONOMIC ANNOUNCEMENTS
Pre-EMU Post-EMU
FR GE IT SP FR GE IT SP
FR CPI 0.131 0.712 0.432 0.304 0.429 0.057 0.315 0.655
(0.581) (0.484) (0.762) (0.735) (0.506) (0.594) (0.495) (0.664)
GE CPI 1.752** 0.599 1.322 1.753* 0.952* 1.054* 0.966* 1.397**
(0.731) (0.609) (0.958) (0.924) (0.513) (0.603) (0.502) (0.674)
IT CPI 0.043 0.219 0.435 0.826 0.083 0.263 0.165 0.107
(0.978) (0.815) (1.282) (1.237) (0.509) (0.598) (0.498) (0.668)
SP CPI 0.474 0.755 0.367 0.256 0.719 0.164 0.677 0.680
(1.008) (0.839) (1.321) (1.274) (0.533) (0.627) (0.522) (0.701)
GE IFO 0.824 0.941 0.902 1.274 1.847*** 2.304*** 1.564*** 2.035***
(0.812) (0.676) (1.064) (1.026) (0.436) (0.513) (0.427) (0.573)
GE M3 0.160 1.267 3.021** 0.247 – – – –
(1.160) (0.966) (1.521) (1.467) – – – –
EA M3 – – – – 0.034 0.259 0.033 0.360
EA M3 – – – – (0.441) (0.518) (0.431) (0.579)
US CPIX 1.042 0.287 0.395 3.083*** 0.330 0.185 0.401 0.226
(0.926) (0.771) (1.214) (1.171) (0.520) (0.611) (0.509) (0.684)
U.S. Non-Farm Pay 1.581*** 0.458 0.608 0.022 4.472*** 1.682** 4.326*** 2.225***
(0.549) (0.457) (0.720) (0.694) (0.599) (0.704) (0.587) (0.787)
U.S. NAPM/ISM 0.545 0.225 0.331 0.381 1.506*** 1.723*** 1.329*** 1.662***
(0.667) (0.556) (0.875) (0.844) (0.468) (0.550) (0.458) (0.615)
Constant 0.436* 0.328 1.262*** 1.379*** 0.183 0.141 0.280* 0.196
(0.262) (0.218) (0.344) (0.332) (0.165) (0.194) (0.162) (0.217)
Observations 294 294 294 294 555 555 555 555
Standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
6 To conserve space, table 4 reports results only for the response of
two-year yields to macroeconomic releases. Results for five- and ten-year
yields are similar and are reported in Ehrmann et al. (2008).
7 It is worthwhile repeating that the inference we want to draw at this
point is not about the direction of the effect that a given release exerts on
financial markets. Positive U.S. surprises, for example, may increase or
decrease yields in other countries, and we do not take a stand on why a
given release has a particular sign. Our test is simply that if an announce-
ment has an effect on the yields of one country, it should have an effect in
the same direction and of a similar magnitude on the yields of other coun-
tries if bond markets are unified.
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erogeneity in yield responses with a single aggregate mea-
sure.
As in table 4, there is clear evidence in figure 2 of con-
vergence in the response patterns of yields in our four euro-
area countries to these macroeconomic announcements.
Moreover, this convergence process seems to have been
strongest just before and after monetary union in 1999,
underlining the likely role of monetary union in this pro-
cess.
To summarize, the evidence in table 4 and figure 2 sug-
gests that the unconditional convergence in euro-area bond
yields documented in the previous section cannot be attribu-
ted simply to a reduction in the importance of idiosyncratic,
country-specific shocks in those countries over time.
Instead, there appears to have been a remarkable conver-
gence in the response of euro-area yields even conditioning
on individual macroeconomic data releases. The timing of
this convergence—and the fact that it did not occur in non-
EMU countries such as the United Kingdom—suggests that
EMU itself was a direct cause. Bond market convergence
appears to have taken place in both an unconditional and a
conditional sense, where we have used major macroeco-
nomic announcements as conditioning variables.
IV. Anchoring of Long-Term Inflation Expectations
We now investigate the anchoring of long-run inflation
expectations in the euro area and the benefits that some of
those countries might have realized from entering the
monetary union. In previous work, Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and
Swanson (GSS, 2005) and Gu¨rkaynak, Levin, and Swanson
(GLS, 2010) used long-term bond yields to investigate the
anchoring of inflation expectations in the United States,
United Kingdom, and Sweden, and we build on their analy-
sis here. In particular, in standard macroeconomic models
in which the steady-state inflation objective of the central
bank is constant over time and known by all economic
agents, short-term interest rates should return within a rea-
sonable time to steady state after a macroeconomic shock,
so that these shocks have only transitory effects on the
future path of interest rates. As a result, one would expect
only a limited response of long-term interest rates to these
disturbances. Putting this prediction in terms of forward
rates, one would expect virtually no reaction of far-ahead
forward interest rates to such shocks.
A. Far-Ahead Forward Interest Rates
Conceptually it is perhaps easiest to think about the term
structure implications of shocks in terms of forward rates
rather than yields. For a bond with a maturity of m years,
the yield rt
(m) represents the rate of return that an investor
requires to lend money today in return for a single payment
m years in the future (for the case of a zero-coupon bond).
By comparison, the k-year-ahead one-year forward rate ft
(k)
represents the rate of return from period t þ k to period
FIGURE 2.—HETEROGENEITY IN THE EFFECTS OF MACROECONOMIC SURPRISES ON TWO-, FIVE-, AND TEN-YEAR YIELDS





bi;jk;lSurprisek;l;t þ Ei;jt ; using a
rolling estimation window of four years.
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t þ k þ 1 that the same investor would require to commit at
time t to a one-year loan beginning at time t þ k and matur-
ing at time t þ k þ 1. The link between these concepts is
simple: an m-year zero-coupon security can be viewed as a
sequence of one-year forward agreements over the next m
years. The k-year-ahead one-year forward rate ft
(k) can thus
be obtained from the yield curve by the simple definition:8





Intuitively, the difference between the nine- and ten-year
yields depends on the expected yield for the tenth year, and
this can be recovered through the formula above.
The advantage of using forward rates rather than yields is
that they serve as a proxy for expectations of future values
of the short-term interest rate, up to a (possibly time-
varying) term premium. If the term premium moves rela-
tively slowly over time, then the discussion in the previous
section (and the analysis in GSS and GLS) suggests that
far-ahead forward interest rates should be unresponsive to
news if long-term inflation expectations are well anchored.9
If EMU improved the anchoring of long-term inflation
expectations in our four euro-area countries, this should be
reflected in a reduced volatility of far-ahead forward inter-
est rates and their responsiveness to shocks. While it is pos-
sible to investigate this implication both unconditionally
and conditionally on data surprises as in the previous sec-
tion, here we present findings only from the unconditional
analysis. This is because anchoring is tested by the absence
of systematic response of far-ahead forward rates to data
surprises, and since there is very little systematic response
to anything in the pre-EMU period (table 4), the conditional
analysis does not add more information to the unconditional
one regarding the anchoring question.10
Given our interest in studying long-run inflation expecta-
tions, we focus our analysis on the longest maturity for
which we have high-quality bond yield data across all of
our countries. The exceptional depth and liquidity of the
markets for government securities around the ten-year hori-
zon suggest focusing on the one-year forward rate from
nine to ten years ahead (that is, the one-year forward rate
ending in ten years). As shown in GSS and GLS, this hori-
zon is long enough for standard macroeconomic models to
essentially return to steady state, so that any movements in
forward interest rates at these horizons are very difficult to
attribute to transitory responses of the economy to a shock.
B. The Behavior of Far-Ahead Forward Interest Rates in
EMU Countries
Studying the simple summary statistics for far-ahead for-
ward interest rates in France, Germany, Italy, and Spain
turns out to be very instructive. Table 5 reports the means
and standard deviations of forward rates for each of these
countries in the pre- and post-EMU periods. While the fall
in the mean of these rates for Italy and Spain is impressive,
our primary interest here is in their variability. Remarkably,
the variability of far-ahead forward rates in Italy and Spain
is twice as large as that in France and Germany prior
to EMU, while the forward rate variance in all four coun-
tries is essentially identical after EMU. While the forward
rates of France and Germany become considerably better
anchored (less variable) after EMU,11 the improvement in
the stability of forward rates in Italy and Spain is even more
dramatic. Thus, it seems that the latter two countries bene-
fited substantially from joining the euro area not only in that
the levels of their forward rates declined, but also in that
the variability of those rates fell substantially and con-
verged to that of France and Germany.
Another way of making this point is through factor analy-
sis. When yields of different maturities are decomposed
TABLE 5.—SUMMARY STATISTICS OF FAR-AHEAD FORWARD RATES
FR GE IT SP
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Pre-EMU 7.22 1.02 6.93 1.00 9.24 2.22 8.78 1.84
Post-EMU 4.83 0.59 4.50 0.56 5.13 0.54 4.82 0.62
Mean and standard deviation of one-year forward interest rate from nine to ten years ahead, daily data. See text for details.
8 If we observed zero-coupon yields directly, computing forward rates
would be as simple as this. In practice, however, most government bonds
make regular coupon payments, and thus the size and timing of the cou-
pons must be accounted for to translate observed yields into the implied
zero-coupon yield curve. Note also that our yield curve data are all quoted
on a continuously compounded basis, which implies that our forward rate
data are given by f
ðkÞ
t ¼ ðk þ 1Þrðkþ1Þt  krðkÞt rather than the equation in
the text, which is for annually compounded yields.
9 GSS and GLS present evidence that suggests that the risk premium
does not vary substantially at daily frequencies in their data sets. Several
papers in the macro-finance literature, such as Cochrane and Piazzesi
(2005) and Piazzesi and Swanson (2008), have also suggested or found
evidence that risk premiums move primarily at business cycle frequen-
cies.
10 That is, while the conditional evidence points to anchored expecta-
tions in the post-EMU period, it does not show systematic responses of
far-ahead forward rates in the pre-EMU period either; thus, it does not
help differentiate between the two periods. The lack of systematic
responses in the pre-EMU period may be due to the fact that in segmented
markets, participants paid attention to news that may not be captured by
our list of macro announcements. The results of the conditional exercise
are available from the authors on request.
11 For German rates, this observation is also made in European Central
Bank (2004).
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into factors, it is standard to find a ‘‘level’’ factor that moves
yields of all maturities in the same direction and by about
as much, and a ‘‘slope’’ factor that rotates the yield curve.12
We ask how much of the variability in two- to ten-year
yields is explained by each of these factors in the four coun-
tries before and after EMU. Table 6 presents the results.
In the pre-EMU period, both the level and slope factors
affected the yields of France and Germany, with a dominant
weight on the level factor (the first factor in table 6), similar
to the United States and United Kingdom (not reported). In
contrast, Italy and Spain in this period had only one factor—
the level factor—influencing their yields, as this factor
explains essentially all of the variation in yields of all matu-
rities. That is, almost all movements in the yield curve that
changed short-term interest rates were typically seen as level
shifts, or permanent changes, affecting the long end of the
yield curve by about as much as the short end. Thus, this evi-
dence suggests a very low level of anchoring of long-term
interest rates in Italy and Spain in the pre-EMU period.
After EMU, however, the weights on the level and slope
factors for Italy and Spain begin to look much more like
those of France and Germany. Moreover, the slope factors
(the second factors in table 6) in all four countries appear to
have become more important after the advent of EMU.
Thus, not only did the variability of far-ahead forward rates
decrease significantly in Italy and Spain after the monetary
union, they also became less closely tied to short-term rates,
implying a lesser degree of pass-through from the short-term
interest rate outlook to expectations about interest rates in
the distant future. By this metric, it appears that Italy and
Spain obtained a much better anchoring of long-term inter-
est rates and inflation expectations as a result of entering the
monetary union. Not only does EMU appear to have brought
about convergence in bond markets, it has done so in a way
that reflects central bank credibility in member countries.
V. Extensions and Discussion
In addition to France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom, we were able to obtain daily yield curve
data for Belgium, Finland, Denmark, and Sweden for a sub-
set of our sample period. Belgium and Finland have been
euro-area members since the birth of the euro on January 1,
1999, while Denmark and Sweden have been European
Union members but have not joined (and are not currently
scheduled to join) the euro area. Denmark strongly and
credibly pegs its currency to the euro and its monetary pol-
icy to the ECB, while Sweden allows its currency to float
freely and pursues an independent monetary policy.
These four additional countries allow us to check the
robustness of our basic results and to better identify the
sources of bond yield convergence in the EMU. Belgium
and Finland allow us to check whether smaller EMU mem-
bers benefited to the same extent as the largest ones. Den-
mark and Sweden, because of their different exchange rate
and monetary policies, provide two additional control coun-
tries that help to shed light on which aspects of EMU have
been the most important for bond yield convergence in the
euro area.13
A. Results for Smaller EMU and Non-EMU countries
The data we have for Belgium, Finland, Denmark, and
Sweden do not extend all the way back to the early 1990s,
so we cannot study the entire process of EMU convergence
for these four countries. However, we do have data for all
of these countries since at least 2003, so we can observe
and compare to what extent convergence and bond market
integration have actually taken place. Figure 3 plots the
time series of yields across these four countries, together
with those of Germany as a benchmark for comparison. The
convergence of the Belgian, Finnish, and Danish yields to
those of Germany is striking. So is the lack of convergence
of Sweden.
Note that Swedish yields at the ten-year maturity are
quite close to those of the EMU members and Denmark.
Sweden has followed a very successful inflation targeting
monetary policy for more than a decade, and Gu¨rkaynak
et al. (2010) present evidence that the Swedish Riksbank’s
inflation-targeting framework has anchored long-run infla-
tion expectations in that country quite well. It is thus not
too surprising that the euro area and Sweden have similar
long-term bond yields, since both have successfully
anchored long-run inflation expectations at similar levels.
TABLE 6.—PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS OF YIELDS WITHIN COUNTRIES
Pre-EMU Post-EMU
FR GE IT SP FR GE IT SP
Contributions of
First PC 0.969 0.957 0.999 0.998 0.899 0.936 0.912 0.905
Second PC 0.031 0.043 0.001 0.002 0.100 0.064 0.087 0.093
Contributions of first and second principal components (‘‘level’’ and ‘‘slope’’ factors) to yield curve movements within each country. See text for details.
12 Sometimes researchers will also consider a third interest rate factor
called ‘‘curvature.’’ However, over our sample period for all of the coun-
tries in our analysis, the curvature factor explains only a tiny fraction (less
than 1%) of the variance of yields. Since that factor is not economically
significant over our sample period, we omit it from the discussion for sim-
plicity.
13 The United Kingdom served as a control country in our analysis
above, but the United Kingdom is a large country that has other systema-
tic differences from continental Europe, such as closer trade ties to the
United States and more laissez-faire labor market policies. Denmark and
Sweden are more similar to continental Europe and are very similar to
each other, and thus may provide a better set of controls for comparison.
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Instead, the differences between Sweden and the euro-area
countries are most apparent at shorter maturities. Figure 1
shows that this same observation also holds true for United
Kingdom yields (as discussed in GLS, the United Kingdom
is another successful inflation-targeting country).
Table 7 quantifies and corroborates the observations
above by regressing bond yields for each of these four smal-
ler European countries on German yields of the same
maturity. As one would expect from figure 3, regressions of
Belgian, Finnish, and Danish yields on those of Germany
give estimated constants close to 0, slope coefficients near
unity, and very high R2 statistics, while none of these is true
for Swedish yields. We do not report results for the com-
plete battery of tests run in the previous section in the inter-
est of space, but these results are very similar and further
corroborate the evidence in figure 3 and table 7.14 Clearly,
bond yield convergence was a general phenomenon in the
euro area that applied to smaller as well as larger EMU
members, and even to Denmark, a country that is not offi-
cially part of EMU.
B. Sources of Convergence: Monetary Policy, Exchange
Rate Peg, or Fiscal Policy?
The Maastricht Treaty laid the foundation for monetary
union in 1992, but it also mandated a loose exchange rate
peg and required basic convergence of fiscal policies in
order for countries to be eligible to enter into the union. To
what extent, then, is the convergence in long-term bond
yields that we see in figures 1 and 3 a result of monetary
union, the loose exchange rate peg leading up to the union,
or a reduction in default risk through fiscal policy conver-
gence?
The pre-EMU exchange rate peg is probably unable by
itself to explain the bond yield convergence in figures 1 and
3. Although the Maastricht Treaty originally required coun-
tries to keep their exchange rates within a band of plus or
minus 2¼% of each other, the ERM crisis in September
1992 led to this aspect of the treaty being revised to allow
fluctuations of plus or minus 15%, a much wider band.
Because of the tremendous width of this band, exchange
rate risk for EMU countries remained quite high in the run-
up to EMU. Moreover, the timing of bond yield conver-
gence in figure 1 does not seem consistent with the 1990s
exchange rate peg playing a major role: for example, from
the onset of the ERM crisis to the loosening of the peg on
August 2, 1993, bond yield spreads across countries did not
widen further, counter to what one would expect if ERM
were the dominant factor keeping yields close. Moreover,
from August 1993 through the end of 1998, the exchange
rate band was unchanged at 15%, yet cross-country yield
spreads both rose and fell substantially over this period,
again suggesting that the pre-EMU exchange rate peg was
not the main driving force.15
This is not to say that exchange rate policy is unimpor-
tant. Denmark has not adopted the euro per se and is not a
member of EMU, but its exchange rate and monetary policy
are pegged so tightly to the euro and the ECB that the
exchange rate risk between the two currencies has been
minimal. As we saw in figure 3, Denmark’s bonds display a
very high degree of integration with those of the euro area,
while Sweden—which has many similarities to Denmark
but a flexible exchange rate and independent monetary pol-
icy—does not display nearly the same degree of bond mar-
ket integration with the EMU countries (So¨derstro¨m, 2009).
The point above is that the loose, pre-EMU exchange rate
peg, with bands of 15%, seems to account for little of the
convergence in long-term bond yields in figure 1; instead,
FIGURE 3.—CONSTANT-MATURITY YIELDS FOR SMALL-COUNTRY SAMPLE
14 These results include raw correlations, principal components analy-
sis, the responses of yields to surprises, and the behavior of far-ahead for-
ward rates, some of which are reported in Ehrmann et al. (2008) and the
rest of which are available from the authors on request.
15 Note that while the announced band was 15%, the actual fluctuations
of exchange rates of the countries that eventually joined the EMU
declined strongly in the run-up to the monetary union. This is in line with
our argument that the band itself was not the main driver of yield spread
convergence before EMU.
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financial market anticipation of the (post-EMU) unification
of the currency, with the associated complete elimination of
exchange rate risk, and common monetary policy appears
to have been much more important.16
To what extent could convergence in fiscal policy, as
required by the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and
Growth Pact, and a corresponding reduction in credit risk
explain the convergence of euro-area long-term bond
yields? Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom all met
the Stability and Growth Pact criteria for fiscal discipline
throughout our sample—in fact, behaving better than some
EMU member countries in this respect. Yet bond yields in
Sweden and the United Kingdom display relatively little
convergence toward those of the euro area. This suggests
that greater fiscal restraint on the part of Italy and Spain
was not a major factor in bringing those countries’ yields
into line with those of France and Germany.
Additional evidence that pre-EMU fiscal policy was not a
major factor behind bond yield spreads is provided in figure 4,
which depicts long-term bond yields for the three largest U.S.
states: California, New York, and Texas.17 Like the EMU
nations, these three states share a common currency and a
unified monetary policy. Unlike the euro area, there is no
equivalent of the Maastricht criteria for U.S. states—their fis-
cal policies are restricted only by political and market forces.
Indeed, the relative fiscal positions of these three states has
varied widely in recent years, along with the booms and busts
in the technology, finance, and oil industries. Yet the comove-
ment of U.S. state bond yields in figure 4 is remarkably similar
to the comovement of euro-area bond yields since EMU in fig-
ure 1 (note the difference in the scale of the vertical axes). The
average daily spread between the lowest and highest yield in
figure 4 is just 17 basis points, and the maximum difference is
54 basis points, very similar to the values for the eurozone
bonds since EMU. Moreover, in figure 4, the ebb and flow of
default risk is clearly discernible: from July 1999 through
FIGURE 4.—CONSTANT-MATURITY YIELDS FOR THREE LARGEST U.S. STATES
TABLE 7.—REGRESSIONS OF SMALL-COUNTRY BOND YIELDS ON GERMAN YIELDS
Post-EMU
BE FI DK SE
A: Two-Year Yields
GE 1.007*** 1.054*** 1.007*** 0.781***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011)
Constant 0.059*** 0.128*** 0.027*** 0.734***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.041)
Observations 1,323 1,323 1,323 1,323
R2 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.72
B: Five-Year Yields
GE 0.995*** 1.021*** 1.008*** 0.820***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.015)
Constant 0.001 0.096*** 0.011 0.801***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.021) (0.056)
Observations 1,323 1,323 1,323 1,323
R2 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.63
C: Ten-Year Yields
GE 0.964*** 0.951*** 1.025*** 1.021***
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.020)
Constant 0.282*** 0.208*** 0.063* 0.084
(0.023) (0.037) (0.035) (0.074)
Observations 1,323 1,323 1,323 1,323
R2 0.91 0.83 0.87 0.61
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *Significant at 10%. **Significant at 5%. ***Significant at 1%.
16 This point is related to the literature on interest rate behavior under
credible exchange rate pegs; see Benigno, Benigno, and Ghironi (2007)
for a theoretical model.
17 These data are the ten-year general obligation bond index for each
state from Bloomberg Financial Services. Note that unlike the eurozone
bonds in figure 1, these U.S. state government bonds receive favorable
tax treatment in the United States, so one should not read too much into
differences in the levels of yields across figures 1 and 4. We will focus
instead on comovement and yield spreads within each figure.
362 THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS
April 2001, California’s fiscal position strengthened as a result
of tax revenues from the technology boom of the late 1990s,
and California’s long-term yields averaged about 25 basis
points lower than those of New York and Texas. From Janu-
ary 2002 through June 2004, and again more recently, Califor-
nia faced severe budget crises, and its long-term bond yields
averaged roughly 25 basis points higher than those of New
York and Texas. Thus, the relatively wide swings in Califor-
nia’s fiscal position in relation to New York and Texas seem
to account for no more than 50 basis points of yield premium
(from25 toþ25 bp) over this whole period. Translating this
observation over to the euro area, it suggests that the conver-
gence in fiscal policy required by Maastricht and the Stability
and Growth Pact was probably not very important for long-
term bond yield convergence in the EMU, perhaps accounting
for less than 1 out of the 8-percentage-point reduction in
spreads in figure 1.
Again, this should not be taken as saying that the fiscal
requirements of Maastricht and the Stability and Growth
Pact were unimportant for EMU. Indeed, one can imagine
that EMU might not have been possible without these
requirements. Our results simply suggest that the fiscal con-
vergence criteria themselves, and any reduction in credit
risk that they implied, were probably not very important for
bond market convergence relative to financial markets’
anticipation of the elimination of exchange rate risk and a
unified, credible monetary policy.
VI. Conclusion
We find much evidence that monetary union in Europe
has effectively created a single, unified euro-area bond mar-
ket, despite the fact that there may be credit risks that differ
across countries and liquidity characteristics that may vary
from one sovereign bond to another. In fact, the ongoing
financial crisis demonstrates that such credit and liquidity
premia can at times still affect yield spreads across euro-
area countries, but these spreads are still very small com-
pared to the period before EMU. Our analysis shows that
bond yield convergence in the euro area has taken place not
only for the level of bond yields across countries but also
for their day-to-day movements, both unconditionally and
conditional on their responses to major macroeconomic
announcements.
Moreover, we find evidence of convergence in the
anchoring of long-term inflation expectations in the euro
area, as reflected in the behavior of far-ahead forward nom-
inal interest rates. All of the countries in our sample experi-
enced some degree of improvement, but the gains have
been the most dramatic by far for Italy and Spain, which
over time have attained far-ahead forward interest rates that
are now as low and as stable as those of Germany and
France, a remarkable achievement.
A comparison of EMU countries to the United Kingdom,
Denmark, and Sweden suggests that convergence in fiscal
policy, the relatively loose exchange rate peg of the 1990s,
or even the common currency itself were not very important
for the convergence of long-term bond yields in the euro
area. Instead, financial market anticipation of the adoption
of a unified monetary policy and the elimination of exchange
rate risk across countries seem to have been the primary fac-
tors driving bond market convergence. Denmark is particu-
larly interesting, since it has experienced the same degree of
bond market convergence as the EMU nations, despite the
fact that Denmark has not adopted the euro per se, instead
choosing to tightly link its currency and monetary policy to
the euro and ECB. Our results are thus relevant not only for
the euro area, but also for the design of common currency
areas in general and for credible fixed exchange rate regimes
such as those in Hong Kong and the Middle East.
In contrast to the strong evidence for convergence in
financial markets from 1993 to 2008, Canova et al. (2007)
find a much lower degree of convergence in the real econo-
mies of the euro area. This highlights interesting issues for
the conduct of monetary policy, which is transmitted to the
national economies through financial markets in a rather
homogeneous way yet faces substantial heterogeneity with
regard to the real economy. Other interesting questions are
whether convergence in financial markets fosters further
real convergence and how default and liquidity risk premia
in the current financial crisis will evolve once the financial
turmoil is over. We leave these important questions for
future research.
Finally, note that we completed our analysis in the fall of
2008, before financial market concerns about a sovereign
default crisis in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal began to
emerge. It would be very interesting to extend our analysis
to these three euro-area countries and examine how bond
markets in those countries behaved relative to those of
France, Germany, Italy, and Spain before during, and after
the crisis.
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